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When a fatal traffic accident happens, we expect the local police and
prosecutors to handle the investigation and criminal charges. When afatal
airplane crash occurs, however, we turn instead to the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The reason is that air crashes are
complicated and the NTSB has vast expertise. Without that expertise,
investigations falter. We need look no further than the mess made by
Malaysian authorities in the search for Flight 370 to see the importance of
expertise in handling complicated investigations and processes. It is easy to
point to a similar series of mistakes by local prosecutors and defense
attorneys in many death-penalty cases around the country. If we are to
continue utilizing capital punishment in the United States, the death-penalty
system should follow the air crash model, not the car crash model. Capital
cases should be handled by an elite, nationwide unit of prosecutors and
investigators who travel to capital-murder sites the way the NTSB travels to
airplane and other catastrophic crashes. As the number ofdeath sentences
dwindles each year, states have incentive to enter into an NTSB model that
allows them to continue using capital punishment without having to handle
the complicated cases themselves. This Symposium Essay argues that capital
punishment as currently conducted at the local level is afailure, but that the
death penalty can be justified if carried out by an elite, national team of
lawyers and investigators.
* Kelly Professor of Teaching Excellence and Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. I am
grateful to Professor Arnold Loewy for inviting me to participate in this symposium and to Alana Biltucci for
helpful research assistance.
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At the time of this symposium in April 2014, the world was mesmerized
by the disappearance of Malaysian Airlines Flight 370.1 There were (and still
are) a number of vexing questions: How can an airplane just disappear? Was
this a nefarious terrorist event or simply an accident? And, perhaps most
surprisingly, with all of the radar and satellite technology in the world, why
could the Malaysian government not find the plane in the days, weeks, and
months that followed?2 What was clear, almost from the beginning, was that
the Malaysian authorities were not equipped to effectively handle such a
complicated investigation.
The deeply flawed search for Flight 370 at first might seem like a strange
analogy for the problems of capital punishment in the United States. Upon
closer inspection, however, it is actually a very good fit.4 The search for Flight
370 was badly mismanaged by Malaysian authorities from the beginning
because they lacked the experience and information to know they were making
grievous errors.5 Because of those poor decisions up front, search teams spent
weeks looking in the wrong place and wasting valuable time and
resources. Malaysian officials later reversed course and redirected the search
based on other evidence.' All the while, the victims' families were anguished
because they received limited information from those in charge and could not
understand what was taking so long.8 And to top it off, many other countries
1. See Kirk Semple, Hunt for Jet's Black Boxes Is a Race Against Time, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3,2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/04/world/asia/hunt-for-jets-black-box-is-a-race-against-time.html.
2. See Keith Bradsher, Hunt for Malaysian Jet Tests Technical Limits, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/08/world/asia/missing-malaysia-flight-370.html [hereinafter Bradsher, Hunt
for Malaysian Jet] (discussing the technological challenges involved in the search).
3. See Keith Bradsher & Michael Forsythe, Series ofErrors by Malaysia Mounts, Complicating the
Task ofFinding Flight 370, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/16/world/asia/
series-of-errors-by-malaysia-mounts-complicating-the-task-of-finding-flight-370.html.
4. Any analogy one might make pales in comparison to the brilliant comparisons the late Andy Taslitz
made in these pages in past symposia. See generally, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Bullshitting the People: The
Criminal Procedure Implications ofa Scatalogical Term, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1383 (2007) (discussing the
impact of "political bullshit" on our society); Andrew E. Taslitz, Why Did Tinkerbell Get offSo Easy?: The
Roles oflmagination and Social Norms in Excusing Human Weakness, 42 TEx. TECH L. REv. 419 (2009)
(analyzing the role compassion plays in our cultures).
5. See Keith Bradsher & Chris Buckley, Malaysia Backtracks on When Airliner's Communications
Were Disabled, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/18/world/asia/malaysia-
backtracks-on-when-airliners-communications-were-disabled.html (explaining that the transportation minister
who briefed the press appeared not to understand the admittedly complicated communications system on the
plane).
6. See Chris Buckley, Jet's Disappearance Puzzles a World Under Constant Electronic Watch, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/world/asialin-a-wired-world-with-abundant-
eyes-a-vanished-jet-vexes-and-perplexes.html ("As recently as last weekend, American aviation investigators
in Malaysia told the government there that it was searching for the plane in the wrong areas, and that it needed
to redirect its search to the Indian Ocean, according to a person briefed on the inquiry.").
7. See Keith Bradsher & Michelle Innis, Search for Missing Jet Is Moved Nearly 700 Miles, Based on
Radar Analysis, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/28/world/asialmissing-
malaysia-airlines-flight-370.html.
8. See Edward Wong, Tension Is Growing as Families of Flight 370 Passengers Hold Vigil, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/18/worldlasia/tension-is-growing-as-families-of-
flight-370-passengers-hold-vigil.html [hereinafter Wong, Tension is Growing] ("'What you say today is
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were involved in the search, spending tens of millions of dollars following
through on flawed search plans set in motion by the missteps of the Malaysian
authorities.9
Capital punishment in the United States operates much the same
way. Cases are reversed at an alarming rate.'0 Many reversals are for
ineffective assistance of counsel." Other capital cases are reversed for
prosecutorial misconduct.12 Still other cases are overturned years later on direct
appeal or habeas corpus because of invalid jury selection, improper arguments,
and incorrect jury instructions.13 The result is years and years of wasted time
while cases wind their way up and down the judicial system.14 Victims do not
understand the process and are anguished by the lack of communication" and
the enormous delays (not to mention the false hopes that come from an initial
death sentence or a later affirmance by a state supreme court).'6 Just like the
search for Flight 370, capital punishment in the United States costs a small
fortune-certainly much more than it would cost to impose life
imprisonment.' 7 And this is to say nothing of other issues'8-such as racial
different from what you said yesterday,' said one man who had waited along with hundreds of other relatives
over the weekend for any morsel of news. Another man said, 'How can you still not know after so many
days?"').
9. See Kirk Semple, Search for Malaysian Jet to Be Costliest in History, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8,2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/09/Worldlasia/search-for-malaysian-jet-to-be-costliest-in-history.html
(noting expenditures by "dozens of countries"); Kirk Semple & Michelle Innis, More Ships andPlanes Join
Searchfor Jetliner, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/31/world/asia/malaysia-
airlines-flight-370.html ("With no trace of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 more than three weeks after it
disappeared, the international search effort intensified Monday, with 10 planes and 10 ships expected to scour
the latest search area .... ).
10. See JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973-1995 6
(2000).
11. Tom Zimpleman, The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Era, 63 S.C. L. REV. 425, 442 (2011).
Zimpleman predicts successful claims are likely to decrease in the future though. See id. at 432.
12. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys to Reduce Prosecutorial
Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1065 (2009) [hereinafter Prosecutorial Shaming].
13. Id. at 1085, 1104.
14. See James S. Liebman & Peter Clarke, Minority Practice, Majority's Burden: The Death Penalty
Today, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255, 337 n.415 (2011) (describing the time on death row); see also Nancy J.
King et al., Final Technical Report: Habeas Litigation in U.S. District Courts: An Empirical Study of Habeas
Corpus Cases Filed by State Prisoners Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(Executive Summary), Nat'l Crim. Just. Reference Service 7 (Aug. 2007), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/
nij/grants/219558.pdf ("Capital cases filed in 2000, 2001, and 2002 have averaged 3.1 years or 37.9
months.").
15. See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
911, 924 (2006).
16. See Margaret Vandiver, The Impact ofthe Death Penalty on the Families ofHomicide Victims and
ofCondemnedPrisoners, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PuNISHMENT 613,621 (James R. Acker
et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003).
17. See Corinna Barrett Lain, The Virtues of Thinking Small, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 397,408-09 (2013)
(explaining that cost played a factor in the decision of five states to repeal their death-penalty statutes and
noting that Illinois, New Jersey, and New York collectively spent more than $500 million on capital
punishment without any executions to show for it).
18. There are certainly other objections to the death penalty beyond those I identify in this paper.
Notably, this symposium specifically excluded the question of innocence, so I leave that aside here.
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discrimination' 9 and geographic arbitrariness 20 of capital punishment within
states-that occur because of local control of death penalty charging decisions.
That such tremendous problems continue to exist over four decades after
the Court first struck down the death penalty as unconstitutional suggests that it
might be time to end our experiment with capital punishment.21 Certainly, as a
matter of pure utility, the cost of capital punishment-arbitrariness,
discrimination, and actual dollars spent-appears to be vastly greater than the
benefits (primarily questionable claims of deterrence) it tangibly provides to
22
society. Even leaving aside the problem of innocence, capital punishment
seems to be the classic example of a disastrous public policy.
Yet, the public is often willing to pay a lot of money for flawed public
programs that convey psychological benefit.2 3 Indeed, we need look no further
than the vast public support for spending tens, or even hundreds of millions of
dollars to find an airplane that has almost certainly sunk to the bottom of the
ocean and from which no human remains are likely to be recovered.24 While
capital punishment is less popular than in the recent past, it still enjoys
considerable nationwide support (and robust support in many southern
states).25 Despite the views of the elite then, perhaps America's experiment
with the death penalty should continue.
If the experiment is to continue, though, America will need to change its
approach to capital punishment. Dramatic reversal rates in capital cases should
not be acceptable.26 Nor should we tolerate racial discrimination2 7 or
defendants facing the death penalty because they committed their crimes in
Philadelphia as opposed to Pittsburgh, or Houston as opposed to a small Texas
19. See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman
Era: An Empirical andLegal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638,
1661 (1998).
20. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Imposing a Cap on Capital Punishment, 72 Mo. L. REv. 73, 93-96
(2007) [hereinafter Imposing a Cap on Capital Punishment] (noting intrastate arbitrariness); Adam M.
Gershowitz, Pay Now, Execute Later: Why Counties Should Be Required to Post a Bond to Seek the Death
Penalty, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 861, 871-72 (2007) [hereinafter Pay Now, Execute Later] (noting intrastate
arbitrariness); Robert J. Smith, The Geography ofthe Death Penalty and Its Ramifications, 92 B.U. L. REV.
227, 228-30 (2012) [hereinafter The Geography ofthe Death Penalty] (documenting the narrow group of
counties seeking the death penalty).
21. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972) (per curiam).
22. See generally Jeffrey Fagan, Death andDeterrence Redux: Science, Law and Causal Reasoning on
Capital Punishment, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255 (2006) (discussing recent deterrence research).
23. Cf Ray Sanchez, Nearly 80% ofAmericans Think No One Survived Flight 370, CNN Poll Finds,
CNN (May 6, 2014, 8:18 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/06/worldlasia/malaysia-airlines-plane-poll/
(discussing how the public wants to spend a lot of money on searching for an airplane that likely cannot be
found).
24. See id. (explaining that although 79% of people thought no survivors would be found, nearly 70%
favored continuing to search for the plane).
25. See Jeffrey M. Jones, US. Death Penalty Support Lowest in More Than 40 Years, GALLUP (Oct. 29,
2013), http://www.gallup.com/pol/165626/death-penalty-support-lowest-years.aspx; see also Ross Ramsey,
UT/7TPoll: Texans Stand Behind Death Penalty, TEX. TRIB. (May 24,2012), http://www.texastribune.org/
2012/05/24/uttt-poll-life-and-death/ (noting that 73% of Texans support the death penalty).
26. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
27. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
154 [Vol. 47:151
AN NTSB FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
county without the resources to seek the death penalty.28 And horror stories
about ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct four
decades after the reinstatement of capital punishment is nothing short of
appalling.29
There is one plausible solution that might solve many of the problems with
capital punishment. Just as we do not send the local police and prosecutors to
investigate an air crash, we should not send local authorities to deal with a
death-penalty case. Instead, final capital charging decisions and the litigation
of all death-penalty cases should be handled by an elite unit of national
prosecutors, investigators, and defense attorneys who are responsible for all of
the nation's cases.
I have previously proposed that states abolish counties' roles in the death
penalty and instead run the death-penalty system at the state level.3 0 Here, I go
a step further and suggest a national strategy for capital punishment.3 1 Local
prosecutors should make the initial decision to label a case as "potentially
capital." Thereafter, they would forward the case to the national death-penalty
team-an NTSB for capital punishment-that would decide whether to seek
death and, if so, would then handle all aspects of the case from pretrial
discovery to the last clemency petition. An NTSB for capital punishment
would insulate charging decisions from the influence of politics, money, and
subconscious racial discrimination. An elite nationwide group of prosecutors
and defense attorneys would also drastically decrease the number of meritorious
claims of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel that
bog down the current capital-punishment system. An NTSB approach would
lead to less arbitrary charging decisions, fairer trials, and shorter appellate
processes with fewer reversals.32
This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I offers a brief explanation of the
flaws in the search for Malaysian Flight 370 and draws a comparison with
American capital punishment.3 3 Part I then describes how the NTSB operates
and posits that it would not have made the same threshold mistakes as
Malaysian authorities.34 Part II then briefly reviews the deep flaws present in a
system allowing local control of the death penalty.3 5 In particular, Part II
discusses threshold decisions about charging leading to arbitrariness, racial
discrimination, and years of appeals and habeas petitions built around those
28. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
29. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
30. See generally Adam M. Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment: The Case for Eliminating
Counties' Role in the Death Penalty, 63 VAND. L. REV. 307 (2010) [hereinafter Statewide Capital
Punishment] (advancing the notion that counties should not participate in the death penalty administration
process).
31. See infra Parts I-IV.
32. See infra Part l.A.2.
33. See infra Part L.A.
34. See infra Part LB-C.
35. See infra Part ll.
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initial mistakes.3 6 Part III then explains how an elite national death-penalty
unit-an NTSB for capital punishment-could create a functional
death-penalty system. Part III explains why, in an era of dwindling numbers
of capital cases, states should be eager to voluntarily opt into a nationwide
capital-punishment system.
I. THE SEARCH FOR FLIGHT 370 AND THE NTSB
A. The Flawed Response by Malaysia and the Analogy to American Capital
Punishment
Entire books will be written about the mysterious disappearance of Flight
370 and the flawed search for it. I want to focus on four issues here-
competence, politics, poor relations with victims' families, and cost-and draw
a comparison to American capital punishment.
First, the Malaysian response smacked of incompetence. Malaysian
authorities failed to understand all of the available radar data and began
searching on the eastern coast of Malaysia.39 During this most crucial time
period after the plane's disappearance-when there was the best chance to see
debris floating on the ocean and to locate the black box before its signal
disappeared-Malaysian authorities directed the international community to
look in the wrong place.40 Over five days passed before Malaysian authorities
redirected the search.4 1
Incompetence is also one of the main criticisms of the players in the
American death-penalty system. An alarming number of defendants receive
ineffective assistance of counsel.4 2 Scholars have long observed that the quality
of lawyering plays an outsized role in determining who receives the death
penalty and who escapes with their lives.43 A small number of ineffective
defense attorneys are conscious of their poor performance but are simply too
lazy to make a better effort." In many more cases, however, the defense
36. See infra Part II.
37. See infra Part M.A.1.
38. See infra Part ll.B.
39. See Bradsher & Forsythe, supra note 3.
40. Id
41. Id.
42. See LIEBMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 5. In Professor James Liebman's study of capital reversals
from 1973 to 1995, ineffective assistance of counsel was the most common reason for state post-conviction
reversal. Id.
43. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for
the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1836 (1994).
44. For example, consider the infamous Joe Cannon in Harris County, Texas, who boasted of hurrying
through capital cases like "greased lightening." See Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal NorJust: The Rationing
and Denial ofLegal Services to the Poor When Life andLiberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 783,
789.
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attorneys are over-burdened or under-trained and thus unintentionally provide
poor legal representation.45
The same incompetence criticism can be pinned on lawyers on the other
side of the courtroom who engage in prosecutorial misconduct. As I have
argued elsewhere, much prosecutorial misconduct is accidental, with
prosecutors failing to disclose exculpatory evidence (or committing other
errors) because they are over-burdened with huge case loads or because they
fail to recognize Brady material due to a lack of training and
experience. 6 Thus, first and foremost, Malaysia's bungled response to the
missing plane shares some of the hallmarks of incompetence that we see in the
American death-penalty system.
Second, politics undoubtedly played a role in the flawed response to the
plane's disappearance. Malaysian authorities did not initially realize the plane
had disappeared until being alerted to that fact by Vietnamese
officials.47 Malaysian military installations also failed to track the plane as it
traveled through their airspace.48 Both of those mistakes were embarrassing,
and the Malaysian government did not want to reveal the holes in its radar and
defense capabilities. 49  The Malaysian government thus kept valuable
information hidden and failed to reveal for a week that its military radar had
spotted the jet flying west and away from the area where the initial international
search efforts were being undertaken.50  The New York Times reported that
''some analysts say Malaysian leaders might have feared the announcement
would reveal ineptitude by the military, since it would appear that crew
members watching the radar had failed at their jobs."5' This likely explains
why Malaysian authorities were slow to accept international assistance in the
search.5 2
Of course, politics plays a huge role in capital cases as well. The worst
offenders are often not the ones sentenced to death. In some truly egregious
45. See, e.g., Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective
Assistance ofCounsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 679, 703 (2007) ("Some trial attorneys admit toroutinely
providing ineffective assistance to their clients. These attorneys simply do not have the time to investigate all
of the cases, research all of the issues, and prepare adequately for all of the trials that come their way."
(footnote omitted)).
46. See Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. 261, 282-85 (2011).
47. See Chris Buckley & Michael Forsythe, 17-Minute Delay Found in Reporting Missing Plane, N.Y.
TIMES (May 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/02/world/asia/malaysia-calls-for-better-tracking-of-
flights.html.
48. See id
49. See Edward Wong, Search for Lost Jet Is Complicated by Geopolitics and Rivalries, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/27/world/asia/geopolitical-rivalries-jet.html [hereinafter
Wong, Search for Lost Jet is Complicated].
50. See id
5 1. Id.
52. See Michael S. Schmidt & Scott Shane, As U.S. Looks for Terror Links in Plane Case, Malaysia
Rejects Extensive Help, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16,2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/17/world/asia/as-us-
looks-for-terror-links-in-plane-case-malaysia-rejects-extensive-help.html.
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cases, prosecutors make the calculated political decision not to seek the death
penalty because the financial cost would be exorbitant.53  Faced with the
prospect of having to raise taxes to pay for a death-penalty trial, some
prosecutors choose the less expensive path and forego the option to seek
death.54 On the opposite end of the spectrum, some prosecutors likely seek the
death penalty in marginal cases to create a reputation for being tough on crime
in order to secure their reelection or move up the ladder to a higher
office." Indeed, a few prosecutors-such as former Philadelphia district
attorney Lynne Abraham-seek the death penalty in every case in which it is
plausibly available rather than making a nuanced effort to seek death in only the
most egregious cases. 6 And some prosecutors who fall in the middle of the
spectrum-people with the very best of intentions-are occasionally influenced
by local news coverage, public opinion, and unconscious racial bias in some
death-penalty filings.57
Third, the Malaysian authorities did a terrible job dealing with the families
of the passengers. Because of the trickle of information, family members
believed the Malaysian government was hiding something.58 Just one week
after the plane's disappearance, The New York Times reported that "[t]o say
many [family members] are exasperated, astounded or fed up with the way the
Malaysian authorities have handled the investigation and search efforts is an
understatement. Last week, people ... lobbed plastic water bottles at Malaysia
Airlines executives."59  A few weeks later, a group of family members
"presented a Malaysian diplomat with a scathing statement saying that the
families would regard Malaysian leaders and the state-controlled operator of the
flight, Malaysia Airlines, to be 'murderers' if it emerged that missteps had led
to the deaths of their loved ones."6 o
Although not nearly as pronounced, family members often feel victimized
by the criminal-justice process in capital cases. As Professor Stephanos Bibas
has explained, there is a great gulf between the knowledge held by insiders and
outsiders in the criminal-justice system.61 Handicapped by a lack of knowledge
53. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Miller v. Alabama: Is Death (Still) Diferent?, 11 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 37,.46-47 (2013).
54. See infra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
55. Richard C. Dieter, Killingfor Votes: The Dangers ofPoliticizing the Death Penalty Process, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/379 (last visited Oct. 25, 2014).
56. See, e.g., Tina Rosenberg, The Deadliest D.A., N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 1995), http://www.nytimes.
com/1995/07/16/magazine/the-deadliest-da.html (discussing how over half of Pennsylvania's death row
inmates came from Philadelphia, where the long-time district attorney sought the death penalty as often as
possible).
57. See Jonathan DeMay, A District Attorney's Decision Whether to Seek the Death Penalty: Toward an
Improved Process, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 767, 770 (1999).
58. See Wong, Tension is Growing, supra note 8.
59. Id.
60. Keith Bradsher et al., Malaysia Says Missing Plane Sent One Last Partial Signal, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/26/world/asia/malaysia-flight-370.html.
61. See Bibas, supra note 15, at 920-31.
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about how the system works, average citizens often feel aggrieved by the lack
of information they receive from prosecutors and how the reality of the process
differs from the inaccurate impression of the system they may have from
television, movies, or other limited data points.62 The sheer length of capital
cases also leaves victims feeling violated as the terrible memories of the crime
are dredged up with every new appeal and habeas petition.6 3 Of course, any
process that protects the rights of criminal defendants will necessarily result in
anger by victims' families. But the sheer scope of appeals and habeas petitions
-to say nothing of reversals and retrials based on avoidable problems such as
prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel-is
unnecessarily jarring to victims' families.6l At bottom, transparency and
information flow are lacking in the current capital-punishment system in the
United States.65
Fourth and finally, the issue of cost is a significant point of comparison
between the search for Flight 370 and American death-penalty cases. The
search for Flight 370 has already cost tens-perhaps hundreds-of millions of
dollars.66 Civilian and military ships and planes from more than a dozen
countries spent weeks scouring thousands of miles of ocean searching for the
plane.67 Each ship and plane was operated by numerous highly trained workers
who stopped performing other tasks so that they could participate in the
search.6 8 And, as noted above, for at least one week these military and civilian
personnel were wasting their time by searching the wrong area because of the
obvious missteps of the Malaysian government.69
The comparison to American capital punishment is obvious. States spend
millions of dollars to run dysfunctional capital-punishment systems. 70 It costs
far more to utilize the death penalty than to impose life imprisonment. 7' And
many of those costs are avoidable. Years of appellate and post-conviction
litigation focused on ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial
misconduct could be avoided if states properly trained and supervised lawyers
up front.72 Just as the sailors on military vessels would not have wasted their
time on the wrong search area if the Malaysian authorities had not withheld
62. See id. at 924-25.
63. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Rethinking the Timing of Capital Clemency, 113 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2323570.
64. See id
65. Professor Bibas has made this point effectively with respect to the criminal-justice system
generally. See STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 51 (2012) ("Secrecy and opacity
weaken citizens' trust in the law and may also make them feel distant and alienated.").
66. See Semple, supra note 9.
67. See id
68. See Wong, Search for Lost Jet is Complicated, supra note 49.
69. See id.
70. See Sherod Thaxton, Leveraging Death, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 475, 545-48 (2013).
71. See id at 541-44.
72. See id at 549 (stating that, "unless [prosecutors] are required to internalize more of the costs of
making poor screening decisions," the threat of the death penalty will continue to be used inefficiently).
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valuable information, so too would appellate judges, clerks, appointed appellate
attorneys, and other players in the criminal-justice system not have wasted their
time if death-penalty trials were properly handled at the outset.
In sum, the bungled response to Flight 370's disappearance looks a lot like
the dysfunctional capital-punishment system in the United States. Both were
(and are) costly and ineffective, while leaving the victims feeling aggrieved.
B. How Might Things Have Been Different if the NTSB Had Been in
Charge?
If Flight 370 had disappeared in the United States, the NTSB would have
been in charge of the investigation.74 Originally, the NTSB was an independent
agent in the Department of Transportation, but it eventually became completely
independent of even that department. The NTSB has jurisdiction over all
aviation accidents, and it handles selected accidents involving other modes of
76transportation. Approximately 80% of the NTSB's work involves aviation
accidents. In an average year, this amounts to roughly 2,000 total incidents.
Although the NTSB is "[o]n call 24 hours a day, 365 days a year" and
travels to the site of an accident immediately,78 it employs a relatively lean staff
of roughly 400 people. It is able to work with a small staff because it taps into
a network of experts from other governmental agencies as well as the private
sector.80  These parties are (with the exception of the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA)) involved in investigations by invitation only and are
81selected for their strong competence across a wide array of areas.
The NTSB is exclusively engaged in forensic analysis and, unlike many
other governmental agencies, has no regulatory portfolio.82 It focuses
exclusively on accident investigations and safety recommendations. It is thus
insulated from politics and able to appear and actually be objective.8 4 Because
73. Compare Wong, Search for Lost Jet is Complicated, supra note 49 (explaining that Malaysian
officials did not announce that military radar had spotted the plane flying in a different direction than where
search efforts were concentrated until a week after the plane disappeared), with Thaxton, supra note 70, at 549
(discussing the costs of poor prosecutorial decision making).
74. See History of the National Transportation Safety Board, NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BOARD,
http://www.ntsb.gov/about/history.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2014) [hereinafter History ofthe NTSB].
75. See 49 U.S.C.A. § 1111(a) (West 2007).
76. See History of the NTSB, supra note 74.
77. See The Investigative Process at NTSB, NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BOARD, http://www.ntsb.gov/
investigations/process.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2014).
78. See NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 5 (2012) [hereinafter ANNUAL
REPORT], available at http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/agency reports/2012Annual%2OReport.pdf.
79. Eric Fielding et al., The National Transportation Safety Board: A Model for Systemic Risk
Management, 9 J. INVESTMENT MGMT. 17, 21-22 (2011).
80. Id. at 17.
81. Id at 21.
82. Id at 17, 19.
83. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 78, at 5.
84. See Fielding et al., supra note 79, at 19.
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of its core competency and its insulation from politics, the NTSB is perceived
to be one of the best functioning governmental agencies.ss
It is, of course, impossible to say whether the NTSB would have been able
to succeed in finding Flight 370 where Malaysian authorities failed. Perhaps
the clues were simply missing and no one would have been able to locate the
plane in the days after its disappearance. It stands to reason, however, that the
NTSB would have had a better chance of finding the plane. The NTSB has
handled over 140,000 aviation accidents in its history, including numerous
major air crashes.86 The NTSB would have been able to quickly draw on its
"party system" to engage radar experts to interpret the data. While it took
Malaysian authorities weeks to find and interpret the radar data, the NTSB
would have been in a position to crunch the data more quickly.88 Additionally,
because it is an independent agency, the NTSB would have been insulated from
politics and able to direct the search based on where the evidence led. 8 9 The
same cannot be said for the Malaysian authorities.
C. The Comparison of the NTSB and a National Capital-Punishment Group
Although I will leave for Part III the details of how an NTSB for capital
punishment could be implemented, at this stage it is worth briefly tying together
the benefits an NTSB approach would bring to capital-case handling.
First, and quite obviously, the NTSB is skilled at air traffic accident
investigations because it conducts a lot of them.90 There is every reason to
believe that assigning dozens of capital cases to the same group of prosecutors
and defense lawyers would likewise be beneficial. Capital-jury selection,
portrayal of aggravating circumstances, witness examination, and mitigation
development by defense attorneys are all skills peculiar to capital litigation and
are crucial to successful defense and prosecution of death-penalty cases.91 The
more one practices a technique, the better one becomes at it. It thus stands to
reason that prosecutors and defense lawyers who focus exclusively on these and
other capital trial skills will become experts at them.
Moreover, capital-punishment law is complicated. 92 Lawyers who handle
an occasional capital case are unlikely to understand the nuances of
85. See id.
86. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 78, at 5.
87. See Fielding et al., supra note 79, at 21.
88. See Bradsher, Hunt for Malaysian Jet, supra note 2.
89. See Fielding et al., supra note 79, at 19-21.
90. See History ofthe NTSB, supra note 74.
91. See generally John H. Blume et al., Competent Capital Representation: The Necessity ofKnowing
and Heeding What Jurors Tell Us About Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1035 (2008) (detailing the
importance and skill of making the "case for life").
92. The leading death penalty casebooks stand at roughly 1,000 pages. See, e.g., RANDALL COYNE &
LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (4th ed. 2012); NINA RIvKIND &
STEVEN F. SHATZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEATH PENALTY (3d ed. 2009).
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death-penalty law to the same extent as an expert who is versed in Eighth
Amendment law and whose sole job it is to handle capital cases.
One might object here that there are already skilled death-penalty lawyers
in some jurisdictions, and that, in any event, understanding the state
death-penalty statute and local rules of practice are just as important as being
versed in Eighth Amendment precedent. Both of those objections are true. The
problem, of course, is not that there are no skilled prosecutors or defense
attorneys handling capital cases today.9 3 The problem is that some capital cases
are handled by incompetent defense lawyers and overzealous
prosecutors.94 This reality merely reinforces the value of an NTSB approach.
Recall that the NTSB has a modest staff of 400 employees and that it utilizes a
party system to draw on a vast network of experts to assist based on the type of
accident and investigation.95 The same could be true in the capital context. A
party system would enable the NTSB group of capital litigators to draw on a
top-notch group of local prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys while
circumventing the unskilled lawyers who would otherwise handle capital cases
because they are the local prosecutors in the jurisdictions or are favorites of the
judge who hands out court appointments.
Second, when prosecutors see a lot of capital cases, they are better able to
put them in perspective and assess the worst cases in which death might be
merited as opposed to simply bad cases in which life imprisonment would be
more appropriate. Thus, a national unit that looks at most of the nation's
worst homicides would be in the best position to deliver what the Supreme
Court has long elusively sought: to limit the death penalty to the worst of the
worst.97 As noted in Part II, the current system of local control of capital
punishment has given us the exact opposite outcome in which geographic
arbitrariness is rampant.9 8
Third, an elite, national capital-punishment group would be insulated from
politics. One of the NTSB's best attributes is that it is independent and can
make its accident determinations based exclusively on the evidence without
interference from political leaders, business executives, or the public, all of
93. For instance, in Harris County, Texas-which long had a poor reputation for capital-defense
lawyers-almost all knowledgeable prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys would point to Robert Morrow
(who has handled dozens of capital cases) as an extremely effective capital defense lawyer. See Lise Olsen,
Attorneys Overworked in Harris County Death-Row Cases, HOUS. CHRON. (May 25, 2009), http://www.
chron.com/news/Houston-texas/article/attorneys-overworked-in-harris-county-death-row-1 727249.php
("Morrow uses a team of legal interns and lawyers involved in a mentorship program to help with his
assignments and specializes almost exclusively in capital work."). The NTSB group could wisely draw on his
expertise, while ignoring other defense attorneys who might be favorites of local judges but who are known
not to be as skilled.
94. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
95. Fielding et al., supra note 79, at 18-21.
96. See New Voices: Prosecutors AmbivalentAbout the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/2246 (last visited Oct. 25, 2014).
97. See Statewide Capital Punishment, supra note 30, at 331.
98. See infra Part H.
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whom have vested interests.99 Local prosecutors are subjected to considerable
political pressure in their capital charging decisions. 00 Prosecutors must stand
for reelection and the surest way to cause themselves political damage is to go
"soft" on a murder suspect.'0 ' A spate of news coverage about a case might
affect prosecutorial decision-making.10 2 District attorneys also might be more
likely to seek death when the victim is a well-regarded member of the
community (or, perhaps subconsciously, when the victim is white).'03 A
national panel of prosecutors will not face these political pressures. A group of
NTSB prosecutors would be diverse and drawn from across the country. The
odds of a local bias affecting charging decisions would therefore be very low.
To fully appreciate the benefits of an elite, national capital-punishment
unit, it is worth comparing them to the current state of affairs. In the next
section I explain what local control of capital punishment has wrought in the
United States.104
II. THE FAILURE OF LOCAL CONTROL OF THE DEATH PENALTY
Capital punishment is controlled locally in the United States.'0o While the
governing law is provided by state death-penalty statutes, it is actually local
prosecutors who have complete control over whether to seek the death
penalty.'06 And local prosecutors are responsible for litigating capital cases at
trial. 07 Thus, while local prosecutors often hand over control to state attorneys
general at the appellate stage, the vast majority of critical death penalty
decision-making is done at the local level. 08
To be sure, there are benefits of local control of charging and punishment
generally and capital punishment specifically. As Professor Stephen Smith has
explained, local control "make[s] the enforcement of criminal law more
responsive to the values, priorities, and felt needs of local
communities."' 09 This makes sense at a global level, of course, as we often
99. See Fielding et al., supra note 79, at 21.
100. See William W. Berry III, Ending Death by Dangerousness: A Path to the De Facto Abolition ofthe
Death Penalty, 52 ARIZ. L. REv. 889, 920 (2010).
101. See James S. Liebman, The Overproduction ofDeath, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2078-80 (2000)
("Local law enforcement is under tremendous pressure to solve the crime and punish the perpetrator, harshly.
If the sheriff and district attorney do so, they can run for office on their success; if theyfail, they risk being
run out of office at the next election." (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original)); DeMay, supra note 57, at
785-86.
102. See Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics ofDeath, 94 VA. L. REV. 283, 311-12
(2008).
103. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1987) (discussing the Baldus study).
104. See infra Part II.
105. See Pay Now, Execute Later, supra note 20, at 862.
106. See id. at 862-63.
107. See id. at 862.
108. See id at 862-63, 891.
109. Stephen F. Smith, Localism and Capital Punishment, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANc 105, 110 (2011)
[hereinafter Localism and Capital Punishment].
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locally elect our judges and prosecutors, and venue rules typically ensure that
crimes are prosecuted where they occurred." 0 The conscience of the
community is surely relevant in determining whether and how severely a local
crime should be punished."'
The problem, however, is that local control of capital punishment has
proven to be an abject failure. Capital punishment is geographically arbitrary
within states.112 Local prosecutors frequently engage in reversible error at
trial."'3 In their charging decisions, these prosecutors likely allow some
subconscious racial bias to slip in, resulting in a disparate number of minority
defendants being sentenced to death.1 14 And local defense attorneys are found
to be ineffective far too often."' A tremendous amount of scholarly literature
supports each of these assertions, so I will sketch them only briefly.
Geographic Arbitrariness: The death penalty is geographically arbitrary
within states. In Tennessee, capital charges are brought much more often in
Memphis than in Nashville."' 6 In Ohio, prosecutors in Cincinnati seek the
death penalty much more often than in Columbus, even though the former has a
considerably smaller population."'7 In Georgia, a murder in Clayton County is
"13 times more likely to bring death-penalty prosecution than a similar crime a
few miles away in Fulton.""'8 In Pennsylvania, death row is filled with inmates
from Philadelphia County-seventy-three as of June 1, 2014-but has only
seven from comparably sized Allegheny County, which is home to
Pittsburgh.1" 9 And in Texas-the supposed capital of capital punishment-
most counties never actually sentence anyone to death. 20 As I explained in
2010,
Harris County, which is home to the nation's fourth-largest city (Houston),
accounts for 16 percent of Texas's population, but 28 percent of its death
sentences. When three additional counties-Bexar, Dallas, and Tarrant-are
added to Harris County, those four localities account for 51 percent of
110. See id. at 110-11.
111. See id. at 111. Of course, even under my NTSB proposal with nationwide prosecutors and defense
attorneys, local juries would still make the ultimate decision on life and death. See infra Part M.A. 1-2.
112. See supra note 20. The death penalty is obviously geographically arbitrary among states as well. See
Statewide Capital Punishment, supra note 30, at 312 n.2 1.
113. See, e.g., LIEBMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 5.
114. See Angela J. Davis, Racial Fairness in the Criminal Justice System: The Role ofthe Prosecutor, 39
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 202, 202-32 (2007); Peggy Nicholson, The Public Outrage Phenomenon and
Limits on Remedying the Effect ofImplicit Racist Attitudes on Capital Charging Decisions, 18 VA. J. SOC.
POL'Y & L. 133, 133-51 (2010).
115. See, e.g., LIEBMAN ETAL., supra note 10, at 5.
116. See Imposing a Cap on Capital Punishment, supra note 20, at 95-96.
117. See id at 95.
118. Bill Rankin et al., An AJC Special Report: A Matter of Life or Death: Death Still Arbitrary,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 23, 2007, at Al.
119. See Execution List, PA. DEPARTMENT CORRECTIONS, http://www.cor.pa.gov/Administration/
General%2olnformation/Documents/Death%2Penalty/Current%2OExecution%2List.pdf (last visited Oct.
26, 2014).
120. Statewide Capital Punishment, supra note 30, at 308.
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Texas's death sentences, but only 40 percent of its population. Adding the
death sentences from fourteen additional counties accounts for roughly 75
percent of Texas's total death sentences. By contrast, there are more than 130
Texas counties that have never sent an inmate td death row in the last three
decades. 121
Recent empirical evidence confirms that geographic arbitrariness is, at least in
part, due to finances. A recent empirical study by Professor Goelzhauser found
that "larger prosecutorial budgets are associated with an increase in the
probability of a prosecutor seeking death against a defendant in a death-eligible
case." 22 Although many prosecutors remark that cost is never a factor in
deciding whether to seek the death penalty, 12 3 more honest prosecutors readily
acknowledge the influence of money, even in Texas. 124 For instance, in a 2005
triple-murder case in Brownsville, Texas, the prosecutor agreed to a life
sentence because "the plea deal was better than a costly fight for a death
sentence that might later be commuted to life. He estimated such a trial and
appeals would cost $6 million." 25 Or consider a 2011 case from Anderson
County, Texas, in which the prosecutor explained that it was "an effective
usage of the county's funds" not to seek the death penalty.1 26 In an even more
recent case from Walker County, Texas, the local judge and county
commissioners speculated openly in the media about the $500,000 price tag for
a capital trial and whether seeking death in that case was worth the cost.127 The
same calculations are made in other states besides Texas. 128
The best evidence of intra-state arbitrariness of the death penalty may be
the egregious cases in which smaller counties fail to seek the death penalty. For
example, prosecutors in Navarro County, Texas-population 48,000129_
121. Id. at 316 (footnotes omitted).
122. Greg Goelzhauser, Prosecutorial Discretion Under Resource Constraints, 96 JUDICATURE 161, 167
(2013).
123. See, e.g., Prosecutor: Death Penalty Hinges on Justice, Not Money, SEATTLE TIMES (June 19,2000,
12:00 AM), http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20000619&slug=4027575 ("Spokane
County Prosecutor Steve Tucker says money won't be a factor in his decision whether to pursue the death
penalty against Robert Yates Jr. in eight serial killings."). In an interesting comparison, officials from around
the world similarly remarked that cost was not an issue in the search for Malaysian Flight 370. See Demetri
Sevastopulo, Length ofSearch for MissingFlight AMI370 Raises Cost Fears, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2014, 1:54
PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b849532a-b347-l 1 e3-b09d-00144feabdcO.html#axzz3HGKsYooc.
124. Lynn Brezosky, Mother Pleads Guilty in Triple Murder, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 1, 2005),
http://madmax.1mtonline.com/textarchives/070105/sl6.htm.
125. Id.
126. See Paul Stone, Death Penalty Won 't Be Sought in Murder Case, PALESTINE HERALD-PRESS (Sept.
20, 2011, 6:30 AM), http://www.palestineherald.com/news/localnews/article_86e7b4ba-758d-5980-a3e8-
70918ale39fl.html.
127. See Cody Stark, Murder Trial Could Be Costly, HUNTSVILLE ITEM (July 23, 2012, 6:25 PM),
http://www.itemonline.com/news/localnews/article0690bd55-9def-5898-89ba-9d30bl 78a0c3.html.
128. See, e.g., Rankin et al., supra note 118 (quoting the district attorney from Muscogee County,
Georgia, for the point that "it is too costly to seek death in every case").
129. See U.S. Census Bureau, State and County QuickFacts, Navarro County, Texas, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/48349.html (last updated July 8, 2014, 6:46 AM).
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allowed a defendant to plead to life imprisonment without parole for the sexual
assault and murder of a six-year-old girl.130 Or consider the Indiana case in
which prosecutors from Pike County-with a population of 13,000-did not
"seek the death penalty for [defendants] who kidnapped a woman and drove
over her body . .. thirty times while she was still alive."' 3  According to the
victim's mother, the prosecutor explained that "the county could not seek the
death penalty because it was too expensive." 32 Other examples abound.
In sum, there are wide variations within states in capital charging, and
these variations appear to be based on cost and finances. Large and wealthy
counties seek death. Smaller and poorer counties do not. It is very hard to
offer a legitimate justification for such a system.
Prosecutorial Misconduct: In his landmark study of capital cases from
1973 to 1995, Professor James Liebman and his colleagues found that a
considerable percentage of capital cases were reversed for prosecutorial
misconduct.134 Among the most prevalent were Brady violations for failure to
disclose evidence, which accounted for nearly 20% of reversible error in capital
cases.'35 Capital cases are also reversed frequently for Batson violations when
prosecutors impermissibly strike jurors based on race or gender.136  And
prosecutors are occasionally found to have engaged in improper pretrial
publicity and presenting false evidence in capital cases.137
The high reversal rate for prosecutorial misconduct is not surprising, as
trying a capital case consistent with the rules of evidence, state statutes, and the
Eighth Amendment is difficult. Some prosecutorial error is the result of
flagrant misconduct by prosecutors who are either inherently unethical 38 or
well-intentioned but bend the rules in hopes of achieving what they think is
justice for the brutal murder cases they are handling. 39
130. See Janet Jacobs, Small Town Tragedy, CORSICANA DAILY SUN (Feb. 14, 2009, 10:21 PM),
http://www.corsicanadailysun.com/archives/article a720cl08-ed9d-5147-9c2d-0756flcefef6.html.
131. Statewide Capital Punishment, supra note 30, at 320 (citing Tim Sparks, Cost ofDeath-Penalty
Trial Can Tip Decision, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE, Oct. 25, 2001, at 1).
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Statewide Capital Punishment, supra note 30, at 320-21.
134. See LIEBMAN ET AL., supra note 10.
135. See id. at 5.
136. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Wishing Petitioners to Death: Factual Misrepresentations in Fourth
Circuit Capital Cases, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1105, 1108 n.5 (2006) (describing Batson as one of the most
commonly litigated issues in death-penalty cases); Prosecutorial Shaming, supra note 12, at 1080-84
(discussing fifteen cases between 1997 and 2007 in which courts reversed or strongly suggested that reversal
was appropriate for Batson violations).
137. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier et al., Vigilante Justice: Prosecutor Misconduct in Capital Cases, 55
wAYNE L. REv. 1327, 1342-46, 1359-64 (2009).
138. See, e.g., United States v. Sterba, 22 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1338 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (describing the same
prosecutor's conduct in a non-capital case as "patent[ly] disingenuous[]"); Ruiz v. State, 743 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla.
1999) (per curiam) (noting "egregious misconduct" in argument to the jury in a death-penalty case).
139. Maurice Possley & Ken Armstrong, Part 2: The Flip Side of a Fair Trial, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 11,
1999), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/chi-020103trial2-story.html (describing how the
prosecutor "portrays himself as a well-intentioned prosecutor who lost control in the heat of battle, driven to
win by a complex blend of factors, including appeasing the family of a victim, earning accolades of fellow
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Other misconduct is surely accidental because prosecutors are overworked
and undertrained.14 0 The lack of expertise is particularly problematic in
death-penalty cases because prosecutors who only occasionally handle capital
cases are handicapped compared to prosecutors who repeatedly try
death-penalty cases. 141 The lack of training or case pressures may even lead
prosecutors to unintentionally allow the race of the defendant or victim to
influence their charging decisions.14 2
Any effort to tally the amount of prosecutorial misconduct is likely to be
underinclusive, as many cases of misconduct will be sufficiently well hidden
(either intentionally or not) and will never see the light of day.14 3 Nevertheless,
we know from newspaper accounts that prosecutorial misconduct is all too
common. For instance, an analysis by The Chicago Tribune found over 360
homicide cases in which courts threw out criminal charges because prosecutors
failed to turn over exculpatory evidence or knowingly used false evidence.144
Ineffective Defense Counsel: Perhaps no other issue related to the death
penalty has received as much attention as the poor lawyering provided to capital
defendants. The story is very similar to the pervasive indigent defense crisis in
non-capital cases.145 Defense lawyers are undertrained, under-resourced, and
overworked. 14 6 Some are competent but lack the time and money to put on a
good defense.14 7 Others are simply incompetent.148 In addition to traditional
trial mistakes, capital defense counsel often perform ineffectively at the
prosecutors and 'getting the bad guy"').
140. See Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 46, at 283-85.
141. See Steve Brewer, County Has Budget to Prosecute with a Vengeance, HOUS. CHRON. (Feb. 4,
2001), http://www.chron.com/news/article/County-has-budget-to-prosecute-with-a-vengeance-2009544.php
(quoting a veteran Harris County prosecutor as saying ,"[W]e just do so damn many more of [these death
penalty cases] than anyone else .... You could go into any district attorney's office in this state and not find
as many lawyers with capital prosecution experience.").
142. See supra note 103.
143. See Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession's Failure to Discipline Unethical Prosecutors, 36
HOFSTRA L. REv. 275, 278-79 (2007).
144. See Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Part 1: The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 11, 1999),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/chi-020103triall-story.html.
145. See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis,
57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1057 (2006).
146. See Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se
Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REv. 967, 972-74 (2012). For instance, less experienced or less skilled
defense attorneys fail to put enough emphasis on investigating mitigating circumstances that will be applicable
at the sentencing stage of trial. See Sean D. O'Brien, Capital Defense Lawyers: The Good, the Bad, and the
Ugly, 105 MICH. L. REv. 1067, 1075-76 (2007) (reviewing WELSH S. WHITE, LITIGATING IN THE SHADOW
OF DEATH: DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN CAPITAL CASES (2006)).
147. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, The Right to Counsel in Death Penalty and Other Criminal Cases:
Neglect ofthe Most Fundamental Right and What We Should Do About It, 11 J.L. SoC'Y 1, 17-19 (2009-
2010).
148. Id at 19-20.
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sentencing stage by failing to conduct an adequate investigation of possible
mitigating circumstances a jury could rely on to spare the defendant's life.149
The Supreme Court has taken a noticeable interest in the ineffectiveness
problem. In a string of decisions in the early 2000s, the Court found defense
lawyers' performance to be deficient for failing to conduct adequate mitigation
investigations.o50 And at the end of that decade, the Court issued a flurry of
additional decisions aimed at clarifying the standard for ineffectiveness. 5' At
the same time, training for capital defense attorneys has improved across the
country.152 As Professor Scott Sundby has explained:
The need for a lawyer to be specially trained in capital defense is now widely
recognized and has fostered the emergence of a professional capital defense
bar. Some states that have had particularly troubling histories with
incompetent capital representation, such as Georgia, North Carolina, and
Virginia, have created statewide systems specifically devoted to capital
representation. 153
There is thus cause for optimism on the ineffectiveness front. Many capital
cases will be defended better than a generation ago, and the courts will be more
willing to reverse those cases in which truly poor performance occurs. Both
developments are helpful to capital defendants, although the optimism should
be tempered. First, while many capital defendants may receive a better defense
than they received a decade or two ago, some will continue to be represented by
undertrained, overworked, or simply incompetent attorneys.15 4 Second, those
who receive ineffective representation will have a better chance of a reversal
during the habeas corpus process. But this simply means continued reversal of
death-penalty cases and costly retrials.
The common thread of these problems-geographic arbitrariness,
prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective defense counsel-is that they could
be minimized in a death-penalty system run by an elite capital unit. One
approach, as I have suggested previously, would be to have an elite statewide
capital unit that handles all aspects of death-penalty prosecutions from charging
149. See Emily Hughes, Arbitrary Death: An Empirical Study ofMitigation, 89 WASH. U. L. REv. 58 1,
592 (2012) (discussing the importance of mitigation and its failure to reduce the arbitrariness of the death
penalty).
150. See id. at 591-94.
151. See id. at 594-601.
152. Scott E. Sundby, The Death Penalty's Future: Charting the Crosscurrents of Declining Death
Sentences and the McVeigh Factor, 84 TEX. L. REv. 1929, 1947 (2006).
153. Id
154. See, e.g., Steve Fry, Cheatham Defense Attorney Labeled Self 'Country Lawyer' Without Death
Penalty Experience, CJONLINE.COM (Apr. 15, 2014, 2:11 PM), http://cjonline.com/news/2014-04-13/
cheatham-defense-attomey-labeled-self-country-lawyer-without-death-penalty (describing a recent Kansas
Supreme Court decision reversing a capital case for ineffective assistance of counsel in which a "country
lawyer" with no death penalty experience later admitted he was unqualified to handle the case).
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straight through the last clemency appeal.'" Another approach-one that takes
account of the declining use of the death penalty-would be for states to form a
consortium and opt into the equivalent of an NTSB for capital punishment.
III. AN NTSB FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
How would an NTSB for capital punishment operate? There are at least
two threshold problems. First, we would have to organize the institution and
arrange for proper funding. Second, we would have to set a protocol for
selecting the NTSB prosecutors, defense attorneys, and staff who would run the
institution and travel around the country to handle capital cases. Both problems
are obviously challenging. Part IM.A offers a brief sketch of how an NTSB for
capital punishment might be established.' 56 Part II.B then turns to the reasons
states should want to participate.'57
A. The Logistics
1. Creating the Institution
The starting point for an NTSB for capital punishment might come from
state attorneys general. The National Association of Attorneys General
includes attorneys general from around the country, and part of its core mission
is to "foster interstate and state/federal cooperation on legal and law
enforcement issues."' 58 The group is perhaps best known for the 1998
agreement in which forty-six states agreed not to sue the tobacco industry in
exchange for a global settlement of more than $200 billion.'59 In more recent
years, state attorneys general continue to work together on a variety of issues
from amber alerts to financial fraud.160 Relying on these long-term working
relationships, state attorneys general could take the first step to organize a
consortium of states that assign capital charging decisions and litigation to a
nationwide NTSB unit. The consortium could start with a modest number of
states and accept additional participants in future years.
Once at least a few states agree to the existence of an NTSB for capital
punishment, the next challenge will be properly funding the unit. Funding for
the capital punishment unit would come from annual payments similar to
insurance premiums. All states would pay a premium, in advance, to be part of
155. See Statewide Capital Punishment, supra note 30.
156. See infra Part M.A.
157. See infra Part U.B.
158. See About NAAG, NAT'L ASS'N ATr'YS GEN., http://www.naag.org/aboutnaag.php (last visited
Oct. 26, 2014).
159. See Myron Levin & Henry Weinstein, Last of46 State Officials Sign Tobacco Accord, L.A. TIMES
(Nov. 21, 1998), http://articles.latimes.com/1998/nov/21/news/mn-46130.
160. See Initiatives, NAT'L ASS'N Arr'Ys GEN., http://www.naag.org/initiatives.php (last visited Oct. 26,
2014).
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the NTSB program. The amount of the payment would vary by state and would
be based on the number of death-penalty cases that have been typically tried in
the state over the last few years. Such data is already available from
independent sources, and in any event, states entering the NTSB group would
certainly be in possession of data about their numbers of death
sentences.161 The idea here is that states should not pay any more to utilize the
death penalty under an NTSB framework than they already pay under a local
control model.
Once the NTSB group begins investigating and handling cases, funding
should continue to operate similar to an insurance premium. If a large number
of death-qualifying crimes occurred in a particular state in Year 1, the NTSB
would handle those cases based on the merits, regardless of whether the costs
exceed the premium paid by the state.16 2 Thereafter, in Year 2, the NTSB
group would raise the premium for a state that had a larger-than-expected
number of death-penalty cases or lower the premium for a state that had a
smaller-than-expected number. Obviously, finding the correct premium might
take some trial and error, but an actuary should be able to find the right baseline
amount in short order.
Because states' participation in the NTSB for capital punishment would be
voluntary, they would only continue to participate if they felt their money was
being used efficiently and was a net benefit to their states. Moving forward, the
NTSB unit would be incentivized to charge fair premiums. Indeed, the system
could operate like a mutual insurance company in which participants receive a
rebate or dividend if the NTSB group has remaining money at the end of the
fiscal year or some other designated time period.
2. Selection and Role of the Lawyers and Staff
Once the NTSB unit is established and funded, the remaining problem
will be to staff it and set protocols for how it will operate.
Selection Process: As I have argued elsewhere, it is crucial that the
prosecutors and defense attorneys selected for an elite capital-punishment unit
meet certain objective criteria.16 3 In particular, the NTSB prosecutors and
defense attorneys should have (1) considerable experience handling capital
cases, (2) unblemished ethics records, (3) low rates of reversal in their capital
and non-capital trials, and (4) no reversals for prosecutorial misconduct or
ineffective assistance of counsel.'6
161. See, e.g., The Geography of the Death Penalty, supra note 20.
162. Unless specified otherwise, insurance policies cover multiple occurrences, even if the cost to the
insurer ends up being much larger than expected when the premium was calculated. See 3 NEW APPLEMAN
ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION § 16.09(3)(a) (Jeffrey E. Thomas & Francis J. Mootz, III eds., 2014).
163. See Statewide Capital Punishment, supra note 30, at 331-33, 335-36.
164. See id.
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The objective criteria are necessary but not sufficient. The NTSB should
survey lawyers and judges who have worked with the prospective hires, just as
local bar associations conduct surveys about judicial candidates.165 Equally
important, the NTSB should interview applicants carefully and observe them in
court.
Because the NTSB capital-punishment unit would be independent, it
would have ultimate authority-without interference from judges, elected
district attorneys, or public defenders who might be biased in favor of particular
candidates for improper reasons-for deciding exactly who should be
hired. The big-picture point is that the NTSB unit should seek out the lawyers
who have a strong understanding of capital-punishment law, excellent litigation
skills, and a reputation among all the players in the courthouse for being fair
and thoughtful attorneys.
Operating the Unit: The NTSB capital-punishment unit should operate
just like the actual NTSB. When a local prosecutor identifies a potentially
capital case, that prosecutor would send the existing file to the NTSB capital
unit. Once it has reviewed the file, the NTSB capital unit would establish a
"Go Team" of prosecutors and investigators who would travel to the local
jurisdiction to take over the investigation of the case. Depending on how
thorough of a job the local authorities have done, the NTSB may not have to
completely replicate the investigation. They will, however, have to undertake a
fairly searching investigation to ensure that all inculpatory evidence helpful to
the prosecution has been located, and perhaps more importantly, that all
favorable Brady material has been identified and accounted for so that it can be
turned over to the defense team.
Once all necessary investigation has been completed, the NTSB
prosecutors will have to determine whether to seek the death penalty (and thus
remove the case from local authorities) or decline capital charges (thus
returning the case to local prosecutors so they could seek any sentence up to
life-without-parole). At this point, a particular strength of the NTSB model
should come into play. The NTSB prosecutors will not face the political
pressures to seek the death penalty the way an elected prosecutor might. Nor
will they be heavily influenced by financial concerns because there is no
prospect that they will have to raise taxes or ask county commissioners to cut
another department's budget in order to pay for a capital prosecution.
Additionally, the NTSB prosecutors will have the benefit of having seen many
death-penalty cases, and these data points will help them to assess whether a
case is truly deserving of the death penalty.166
The charging decisions would be made at the NTSB's home office, not in
the local jurisdiction at the site of the crime. This would enable a few
165. See id. at 333.
166. By contrast, a small-town prosecutor who handles only a small number ofhomicides has insufficient
information to make such a comparison.
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important events to occur. First, the charging decision would be made by a
committee of prosecutors, rather than by a single prosecutor who might have
tunnel vision based on what was seen on the ground at the local
jurisdiction.167 Second, the investigating prosecutor would write a
memorandum informing the charging committee of the facts necessary to make
a capital charging decision. Importantly, the memorandum (and any
subsequent oral discussion) should make no reference to (1) the race of the
defendant, (2) the race of the victim, or (3) the county where the case came
from.168 Excluding these irrelevant factors from the discussion would make it
less likely that they would have any effect on the charging decision. Third,
before the charging committee could decide to seek the death penalty, it would
have to listen to a presentation from the defense attorney as to why the case
does not merit the death penalty.16 9  Because defense counsel might have
important mitigation (or even guilt stage) information that would undermine the
prosecution, it is important for the committee to be aware of it (should the
defense wish to share it) to avoid wasting considerable time and money on a
case that might turn out to be much weaker than it initially appears.
If the charging committee does seek death, NTSB prosecutors and defense
attorneys will try the case, likely without involvement from any local
lawyers. Like the actual NTSB, however, the elite capital unit would utilize a
party system that enables them to draw on experts from outside the capital
unit. Thus, if a state's death-penalty statute were particularly complicated, or if
the case called for a particular type of mitigation specialist, the NTSB might
draw on local prosecutors or defense attorneys to assist in the trial. As with the
actual NTSB, though, those outside parties would only be involved if they were
specifically invited to participate by the NTSB capital unit.
In sum, the elite NTSB unit would conduct its own investigation of the
crime, ensure that Brady material was turned over to the defense team, and then
convene a committee to conduct a race-blind and geography-blind assessment
of whether the death penalty was warranted. If the case was deemed
death-worthy, an elite team of prosecutors and defense attorneys with vast
experience and proven ethics would try the case in a way that was less likely to
create wrongful death sentences and reversible error.
167. See generally John A. Horowitz, Note, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Death Penalty: Creating a
Committee to Decide Whether to Seek the Death Penalty, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2571 (1997) (providing a
more detailed description of this idea).
168. See Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the Department
ofJustice's Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 411-12 (1999) (explaining that capital cases are presented to
the United States Attorney General in a "race blind" format).
169. See Statewide Capital Punishment, supra note 30, at 340.
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B. Why Would States Opt into a Nationwide System?
While a nationwide NTSB for capital punishment should be very
effective, it obviously is not constitutionally required. Basic federalism dictates
that states are free to run their own death-penalty systems, either at the state
level or by delegating prosecutorial authority to counties. 170 States would thus
have to choose to opt into an NTSB system. As explained below, there are
good reasons for states to voluntarily join an NTSB system and cede control of
their capital cases.
Political Incentives: Capital punishment is still popular in America, and
politicians still benefit politically from advocating for the death penalty.172 This
suggests that prosecutors-who are already known to be very territorial-will
not want to cede control of their most high-profile cases.173 Nevertheless,
politicians (including elected district attorneys) do not like the heat that comes
when the death-penalty system operates poorly.174 And with over 140 death
row exonerations-including sixty since the year 2000-there has been a lot of
heat.'75 Moreover, as the public has learned about the enormous amount of
money spent (and wasted) on failed capital prosecutions and appeals,176 support
for capital punishment has dropped to its lowest rate in four decades.' 77 In the
last decade, six states have abolished capital punishment, in large part based on
concerns about cost and innocent defendants. 78
An NTSB for capital punishment allows politicians the best of both
worlds. First, politicians can be vociferously in favor of capital punishment
without having to internalize the costs of the prosecution. The politicians-
including elected prosecutors-would merely be making public statements in
support of the death penalty and would not actually have to make the difficult
charging decision to seek death. The NTSB prosecutors would hopefully
170. See Localism and Capital Punishment, supra note 109, at 105.
171. Id.
172. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
173. See Liebman & Clarke, supra note 14, at 347.
174. See, e.g., Alan Berlow, The Texas Clemency Memos, ATLANTIC (July 1, 2003, 12:00 PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2003/07/the-texas-clemency-memos/302755/ (discussing the
tremendous amount of negative media attention unleashed by the lack of review of Govemor George W. Bush
and his counsel, Alberto Gonzales, before denying clemency requests); R. Jeffrey Smith, Gonzales's
Clemency Memos Criticized, WASH. PoST (Jan. 6, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/
A51773-2005Jan5.html.
175. See Innocence: List ofThose Freedfrom Death Row, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-list-those-freed-death-row?scid6&did=110 (last visited Oct. 26, 2014).
176. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
177. See Damla Ergun, New Low in Preference for the Death Penalty, ABC NEWS (June 5,2014,7:00
AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2014/06/new-low-in-preference-for-the-death-penalty/.
178. Hadar Aviram & Ryan Newby, Death Row Economics: The Rise ofFiscally Prudent Anti-Death
Penalty Activism, 28 CRIM. JUST., no. 1, Spring 2013, at 33, 38-39; see States with and Without the Death
Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last
visited Oct. 26, 2014).
2014]) 173
TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW
ignore the politicians' bluster and decide whether to seek death based on the
merits of the case.
Second, politicians could favor capital punishment as vocally as they like
without having to shoulder responsibility for the litigation and outcome of the
prosecutions. The NTSB prosecutors would handle the case with no
involvement from local prosecutors or elected officials. If things went well, the
elected officials would be happy (and perhaps even try to take credit). If the
defendant was not sentenced to death, or if the death sentence was reversed on
appeal, the elected prosecutor would not be responsible because he would have
had no role in the trial or appeals. In sum, politicians would be able to retain
the political benefits of the death penalty without risking the blame that comes
from unsuccessful or reversed prosecutions.
Cost: In addition to naked political ambition, there is a good policy reason
for states to enter into an NTSB approach. The number of death sentences in
the United States has declined dramatically in the last fifteen
years.179 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, states consistently sentenced 250 to
300 defendants to death per year in the United States. 80 Beginning around
2000, however, there was a precipitous decline.18 By 2010, the annual number
of national death sentences declined to 109.182 And over the last few years, the
number has fallen further, to roughly eighty per year.183 There are now less
than a third as many death sentences nationally as there were only fifteen years
ago. 184
More noteworthy than the national trend is that some mass producers of
death sentences have stopped sending inmates to death row. For years, Harris
County, Texas was the leading producer of capital cases in the United
States.185 Harris County sought the death penalty in about fifteen cases per year
and was frequently successful in procuring death sentences.18 6  In 2012,
however, Harris County did not send a single inmate to death row.' 8 7 In 2013,
it sent only one.188 Other frequent users of capital punishment-Philadelphia
County in Pennsylvania, Hamilton County in Ohio, Shelby County in
179. See Death Sentences in the United States from 1977 by State and by Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO.
CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-united-states-1977-2008 (last visited Oct. 26,
2014) [hereinafter Death Sentences by State and by Year].
180. Id.
181. Id
182. Id
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See, e.g., Scott Phillips, Continued Racial Disparities in the Capital of Capital Punishment: The
Rosenthal Era, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 131, 132 (2012).
186. See Imposing a Cap on Capital Punishment, supra note 20, at 75 & n.13.
187. See 2012 Sentencing, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/2012-
sentencing (last visited Oct. 26, 2014).
188. See 2013 Sentencing, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/2013-
sentencing (last visited Oct. 26, 2014).
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Tennessee, and San Diego County in California, to name just a few-have also
seen a decline in death sentences.189
The most stunning statistic might simply be that, in 2012 and 2013, only
three counties in the United States sent more than two people to death
row. 190 In 2012, there were only nine counties in the United States that sent
more than one person to death row.'91 In 2013, only thirteen counties had more
than one death sentence.19 2 Put differently, in 2013, forty-five of the
seventy-nine death sentences in the United States came from counties that sent
only one inmate to death row.'93 In 2012, the number was even more stark,
with fifty-one of the seventy-nine death sentences coming from counties that
sent only one inmate to death row.194
The data indicate that counties throughout the United States are
mobilizing time and resources to have their prosecutors and defense lawyers
learn the complicated law and strategy of death-penalty prosecutions so that
they can handle one capital case every year or every few years.' 95 And these are
the counties that are actually seeking the death penalty.196 The vast majority of
counties, even in states that authorize the death penalty, almost never sentence
anyone to death.'97 As Professor Robert Smith has documented, between 2004
and 2009, "[j]ust 10% of counties nationally returned even a single death
sentence."' 98
Given that capital-punishment law is complicated, that very few counties
seek the death penalty with any regularity, and that cases are frequently
reversed for errors by prosecutors and defense attorneys, the idea of local
prosecution seems undesirable. To put it simply, when there is a rare
catastrophic event like an airplane crash, train derailment, or other complicated
disaster, the local jurisdiction does not ask its local police department to spend
time and money learning how to investigate the disaster. For rare and
complicated events, we call upon specialists such as the NTSB.
Adopting an NTSB approach to capital punishment is far more sensible
than local control. Under an NTSB approach, local prosecutors would not have
to develop expertise in the state capital statute, Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, capital jury selection, presentation of aggravating circumstances,
or other skills. Public defenders and appointed lawyers would not have to
become experts in mitigation and the case for life, nor would they have to
189. See id; 2012 Sentencing, supra note 187.
190. See 2012 Sentencing, supra note 187; 2013 Sentencing, supra note 188.
191. See 2012 Sentencing, supra note 187.
192. See 2013 Sentencing, supra note 188.
193. See id.
194. See 2012 Sentencing, supra note 187.
195. The Geography of the Death Penalty, supra note 20, at 229-30.
196. Id.
197. Id at 228.
198. Id
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become versed in the statutory and constitutional law of capital punishment.
All of this, by itself, is likely to save money.
An elite team of prosecutors and defense attorneys is also likely to produce
fewer marginal death sentences that will be reversed on appeal. Fewer
reversals will mean less wasted money. Capital punishment as currently
operated is incredibly expensive. An NTSB approach to capital punishment
should be far more cost effective than the current system of local control. And
in a time of tight budgets, states have recently shown themselves to be willing
to consider cost-saving approaches that would have been politically unpalatable
only a few years ago.199
IV. CONCLUSION
The use of capital punishment has declined dramatically in recent
years.200 At present, there are only about eighty death sentences per year in the
entire nation. 2 0 1 Even though litigating capital cases requires prosecutors and
defense attorneys to understand complicated legal doctrine and master difficult
litigation skills, responsibility for this complex, yet rare task is widely diffused
among a large number of lawyers throughout the United States. Put differently,
in almost all of the thirty-two states that have authorized the death penalty,
capital cases are prosecuted at the county level.202 In total, that puts prosecutors
and defense attorneys in more than 2,200 total counties203- on call to potentially
handle one of the roughly eighty cases in which death sentences are handed
down each year in the United States.204 Some of these prosecutors and defense
lawyers are excellent, but many others lack the time to study the law and the
skill to conduct a clean trial.205 As a result of that lack of knowledge,
experience, and skill, cases are reversed on appeal.206 Victims' families are
further harmed by the emotional roller coaster.207 And vast amounts of money
are wasted on appeals and retrials that could have been avoided if the case was
handled correctly from the start. 208
There is a better way. States should voluntarily opt into a nationwide
capital-punishment system in which capital cases are handled exclusively-
199. See generally Nicole D. Porter, On the Chopping Block 2012: State Prison Closings, SENT'G
PROJECT (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/On%20the%2OChopping%20
Block%202012.pdf (explaining that states have closed prisons over the last few years).
200. See Death Sentences by State and by Year, supra note 179.
201. See id
202. Very small states, such as Delaware, handle all criminal cases-at the state level. See Statewide
Capital Punishment, supra note 30, at 314 n.31.
203. See Find a County, NAT'L ASS'N COUNTIEs, http://www.naco.org/counties/pages/findacounty.aspx
(last visited Oct. 26, 2014).
204. See Death Sentences by State and by Year, supra note 179.
205. See supra Part I.
206. See supra Part I.
207. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
208. See supra Part H.
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from initial charging until acquittal or execution-by an elite unit of
prosecutors and defense attorneys. 209  The NTSB fulfills this role for
transportation accidents. In a given year, the NTSB travels the country and
investigates dozens of major accidents and roughly 200 less serious
210
accidents. With an NTSB for capital punishment, an elite team of national
prosecutors would travel to locations where capital charges are justified and
211take over the investigations. If the NTSB unit decided to seek the death
penalty, it would then handle the trial and appeals.212 An NTSB for capital
punishment would minimize, if not eliminate, politics from charging
decisions.1 It would also limit reversals by minimizing valid claims of
prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel.214
Even though there is a very long tradition of local control of prosecution in
the United States, death truly is a different type of prosecution, and states
should consider breaking from tradition. An NTSB for capital punishment
would serve politicians' naked political instincts because they could be as
pro-death penalty as they like without having to actually personally take
responsibility for the handling and outcome of individual prosecutions.2 15 And
from a policy perspective, given that there are only eighty death sentences in
the United States each year, it makes little sense for local prosecutors and
defense attorneys to cling to control of complicated cases that could be better
handled by an elite national unit.216
209. See supra Part LA-B.
210. See Fielding et al., supra note 79, at 31 ("With about 400 employees in an organization that
investigated 13 major accidents, 10 international accidents, and 195 other accidents in fiscal year 2009 . . .
211. See supra Part l.A.2.
212. See supra Part .A.2.
213. See supra Part I.B.
214. See supra Part I.
215. See supra Part E.B.
216. See supra Part 1.B.
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